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Abstract A simple rule for the optimal global price of
carbon is presented, which captures the geophysical,
economic, and ethical drivers of climate policy as well
as the effect of uncertainty about future growth of con-
sumption. There is also a discussion of the optimal
carbon budget and the amount of unburnable carbon
and stranded fossil fuel reserves and a back-on-the-
envelope expression are given for calculating these. It
is also shown how one can derive the end of the carbon
era and peak warming. This simple arithmetic for deter-
mining climate policy is meant to complement the sim-
ulations of large-scale integrated assessment model, and
to give analytical understanding of the key determinants
of climate policy. The simple rules perform very well in a
full integrated assessment model. It is also shown how to
take account of a 2 °C upper limit on global warming.
Steady increases in energy efficiency do not affect the
optimal price of carbon, but postpone the carbon-free era
somewhat and if technical progress in renewables and
economic growth are strong leads to substantially lower
cumulative emissions and lower peak global warming.
Keywords Social cost of carbon . Carbon budget . Peak
warming . End of carbon era
JEL codes H21 . Q51 . Q54
Introduction
Climate change is the world largest externality (Stern
2007) and climate policy needs to correct this externality
by establishing cost transparency in the energy market.
Fossil fuels are currently too cheap, since users of this
energy type are not shouldering the cost of future cli-
mate damages and renewable energy is still in its infan-
cy. The introduction of a carbon tax (or a cap on overall
emissions levels) will shift demand in the global energy
system away from dirty towards carbon-free energy
sources. It will also increase the cost of energy overall,
at least in the short run while efficiency improvements
in the renewable energy sector are still ongoing, making
investments in energy demand reductions more attrac-
tive. Here we present the arithmetic underlying carbon
pricing and show how to calculate in a simple way the
optimal timing of the transition to the carbon-free era
and the amount of cumulative carbon emissions and
peak global warming. Our rule for the carbon price is
simple but robust and can be useful for analysing the
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effects of carbon pricing on patterns of energy genera-
tion and energy use.
Climate policy has to combine ethical judgments
with projections about future economic, technological,
and climatic developments. Integrated assessment
models (IAMs) aim to do this, but have been criticised
for being highly complex, insufficiently open access,
and underestimating the threats of climate change
(Stern 2016). We present a simple framework that cap-
tures the essence of IAMs, makes their underlying as-
sumptions transparent, and opens the discussion of the
political and social obstacles to climate policy. Our cost-
benefit analysis of climate action yields a simple rule for
the optimal global price of carbon in the presence of a
backstop renewable energy source that is currently more
expensive than fossil fuel. This price is proportional to
current world GDP and depends on key ethical consid-
erations, damage flows and geophysical parameters. We
also offer rules for the optimal fraction of fossil fuel
reserves that should be left in the crust of the earth (cf.
Carbon Tracker 2013; McGlade and Ekins 2015) and
the optimal transition time to the carbon-free era. Our
calculations require only a pencil and the back of an
envelope, but yield values very close to those obtained
from numerically maximising welfare with a detailed
IAM of growth, development, energy, and climate
change. We hope that our simple arithmetic helps
policy makers and climate scientists to gain a better
understanding of the ethical, economic, and geophysical
drivers of optimal climate policy.1
The outlay of the paper is as follows. The BThe
carbon cycle and the cost of emitting carbon^ sec-
tion discusses the multi-box carbon cycle and the
cost of emitting carbon, the BIntergenerational ethics
and the risk-adjusted discount rate^ section dis-
cusses the intergenerational ethics and the risk-
adjusted discount rate, the BSimple rule for the glob-
al price of carbon^ section presents our simple rule
for the optimal price of carbon, the BThe energy
transition, the carbon budget, and stranded fossil
fuel reserves^ section derives the optimal carbon
budget and the amount of stranded fossil fuel re-
serves, and the BEnd of carbon era and peak
warming^ section shows how to calculate the onset
of the carbon-free era and peak warming and derives
the effects of energy efficiency. The BPutting it
together^ section puts it all together, and the
BCalibration and illustrative policy simulations^ sec-
tion offers a calibration and illustrates our analysis
with some simulations. The BImplementing the 2 °C
target^ section shows how to take account of a 2 °C
upper limit on global warming. The BPerformance of
the simple rules^ section shows how well our simple
arithmetic of climate policy performs in a full inte-
grated assessment model. The BCarbon capture and
sequestration as backstop^ section discusses carbon
capture and sequestration. The BConclusion^ section
concludes.
The carbon cycle and the cost of emitting carbon
The global price of emitting carbon, P, should gener-
ally be set to the social cost of carbon, which is the
present discounted value of all future economic dam-
ages from emitting one ton of carbon today. This
price can be levied via either a carbon tax or an
emissions permit. To compute future economic dam-
ages, we allow for n different parts of the atmospher-
ic carbon stock each one of them decaying at a
different rate. This leads to a so-called n-box model
of the carbon cycle. With the fraction ai of each
emitted ton entering a box i with exponential decay
rate bi, the amount left in the atmosphere after t years
equals ∑ni¼1ai 1−bið Þ t. The easiest is to have a two-
box carbon cycle (i.e. n = 2) with the first box
consisting of the permanent component of atmo-
spheric carbon which corresponds to the 20% of
carbon emissions stays up for thousands of years in
the atmosphere (a1 = 0.2, b1 = 0) and a second box
consisting of the transient component of atmospheric
carbon (a2 = 0.32 and b2 = 0.0023). Such a simple
modelling of the carbon cycle captures well the car-
bon cycle of the most prominent IAM, i.e. DICE set
out in Nordhaus (2008) (Golosov et al. 2014).2
Next, we assume that the flow damage at time t of an
extra ton of atmospheric carbon is proportional to world
GDP, i.e. d GDPt, where d is estimated to be 5.3% of
1 Allen (2016) also offers a simple framework for analysing the drivers
of peak warming and the optimal carbon budget in a consumer-
maximising world, but focuses on the need for carbon capture and
sequestration rather than the transition to renewable energy and does
not discuss the ethical drivers of climate policy or the optimal timing of
the transition to the carbon-free era.
2 A three-box model leads to a slightly better short-run temperature
response (Gerlagh and Liski 2017).
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GDP at roughly 2 °C based on DICE and does not vary
much with temperature (Golosov et al. 2014).3 It takes a
long time before changes in the stock of atmospheric
carbon affect global mean temperature and cause dam-
ages to aggregate production. We model this by
allowing for a simple exponential lag between projected
global mean temperature and the damages that result
from that on the one hand and the stock of atmospheric
carbon of l years on the other hand. We denote the mean
of this exponential lag by the parameter l. In our baseline
calibration, we take this mean lag l to be 70 years.
Intergenerational ethics and the risk-adjusted
discount rate
Given that climate change resulting from burning carbon
today occurs decades or centuries ahead, the flow damages
computed above have to be summed and discounted tak-
ing account of the slow uptake of atmospheric carbon in
biosphere and oceans. Economists use the social discount
rate, SDR, for this, which is a concept that has been hotly
debated in climate economics (Stern 2007; Nordhaus
2007; Weitzman 2007). The pure rate of time preference
or alternatively the rate of time impatience is denoted by
RTI. The growth-corrected social discount rate, i.e. SDR –
g, consists of the RTI plus four corrections to allow for the
rising affluence of generations, damages growing at the
same rate as world GDP, risk aversion and prudence, and
stochastic shocks to damages being proportional to shocks
to future world GDP, respectively. These corrections are
summarised by the following generalised Keynes-Ramsey
rule for distributing consumption optimally over time:
SDR−g ¼ RTIþ IIA g−g− 1
2
 RRA PRU σ2 þ RRA σ2
ð1Þ
(e.g. Gollier 2013). The first two terms on the right-hand
side of the expression (1) trade off the rate of time impa-
tience, RTI, which indicates how much less valuable con-
sumption of future generations is simply because it occurs
in the future, and the ethical judgement about the permis-
sible levels of income inequality across generations. If
living standards are proxied by the world GDP and grow
at a constant rate g > 0, future generations will be richer
than current generations and the latter should be spared
costly investments simply because they are poorer already.
This effect is strong if the growth rate, g, and the coefficient
of relative intergenerational inequality aversion, denoted
by IIA, are large. Note that the parameter IIA in this second
term corresponds to the inverse of the usual elasticity of
marginal consumption (often denoted by η) and for the
case of expected utility analysis corresponds to the inverse
of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, denoted byRRA,
too. With more general non-expected utility analysis, the
two parameters IIA and RRA can be freely chosen from
each other and the parameter restriction IIA = 1/RRA no
longer needs to hold (Epstein and Zin 1989). The third
term in (1) is –g and ensures that the SDR is the growth-
corrected social discount rate to reflect that damages from
global warming are proportional to world GDP and thus
grow at the rate g too. The fourth term in (1) is the SDR
and corresponds to the prudence effect, which is large if the
variance of expected future consumption growth, denoted
by σ2, the coefficient of relative risk aversion, RRA, and
the coefficient of relative prudence, denoted by PRU
(which is equal to 1+IIA for power utility functions and
for Epstein-Zin preferences), are high (cf. Kimball 1990).
It pushes down the SDR and will make climate policy
more ambitious. The fifth term in (1) captures risk aversion
with respect to uncertainty about future damages which are
perfectly correlated with future GDP. It pushes up the SDR
and will make climate policy less ambitious, since shocks
that increase future damages also increase future GDP and
are thus easier to take care of in the future. This is akin to a
Bclimate beta^ effect (cf. Dietz et al. 2017).
We can rewrite (1) to obtain an alternative expression
for the growth-corrected SDR:
SDR−g ¼ RTIþ IIA−1ð Þ  ~g with ~g≡g− 1
2
 RRA σ2; ð1′Þ
where ~g is the trend growth rate corrected for risk
aversion with respect to uncertain future consumption
growth and consequent damages from global warming.4
Following Nordhaus (2008), we use baseline values for
the RTI of 1.5% per annum and for the IIA and the RRA
of 1.45. The baseline standard deviation of global annu-
al consumption growth had a standard deviation of 3.6%
over much of the past century and our baseline thus sets
σ = 0.036. Hence, the growth correction to allow for
both prudence and stochastic damages in expression3 Most IAMs assume damages as a fraction of GDP to be convex in
temperature while temperature is usually concave (logarithmic) in
atmospheric concentrations so that the overall effect gives a near linear
relationship.
4 Gollier (2013) uses SDR = RTI + IIA × g − 0.5 RRA × PRU × σ2,
where PRU = 1 + IIA.
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(1′), i.e. −0.5 × RRA × σ2, is only − 0.094% per annum
which depresses the growth-corrected SDR by a mere
0.042% per annum, i.e. −0.5 × (IIA − 1) × RRA × σ2.
The prudence term in expression (1), i.e. −0.5 × RRA ×
PRU × σ2, depresses the SDR by 0.23% per annum.
Simple rule for the global price of carbon
Taking the present value of the flow damages of what is
left in the atmosphere at each future point of time and
using (1′) for the growth-corrected SDR gives our rule
for the optimal price of carbon, P:
P ¼ Ω dGDP with Ω≅ 1
1þ SDR−gð Þl
 
∑
n
i¼1
ai 1−bið Þ
SDR−g þ bi
 
:
ð2Þ
This rule offers the following insights into the
drivers of climate policy. First, the optimal global
price of carbon is proportional to and rises with
world GDP, about 66 trillion US dollars in 2010,
and to the flow cost of global warming per ton of
emitted carbon, d. Second, the global carbon price
is high if the SDR is low, which from (1) is the
case if welfare of future generations is not
discounted much (low RTI) and, given trend GDP
growth, intergenerational inequality aversion is
weak (low IIA). Third, if IIA > 1, the ethical posi-
tive effect of higher trend growth (higher g) on the
SDR via richer future generations dominates the
negative effect on SDR − g due to faster growing
damages of global warming. This depresses the
optimal price of carbon. In contrast, more uncer-
tainty about future consumption growth, especially
if risk aversion is substantial (high RRA), curbs the
growth-corrected discount rate and boosts the price
of carbon. Fourth, lower decay rates of atmospheric
carbon (higher bi) and a shorter temperature lag
(low l) increase the carbon price due to longer-
lasting and more immediate damages. Energy effi-
ciency does not impact the optimal price of carbon.
The energy transition, the carbon budget,
and stranded fossil fuel reserves
Recent studies quantify the amount of fossil fuel which
must be abandoned in the crust of the earth for global
warming to stay below 2 °C (McGlade and Ekins 2015).5
Underlying such estimates is the basic economic idea that
fossil fuels are used as long as they are cheaper than
renewable energy. The carbon price increases the cost
of fossil energy and ensures that renewable energy is
phased in earlier. To estimate the optimal carbon budget,
we suppose that the cost of extracting one ton of carbon
falls with time due to directed technical progress at the
rate rE (e.g. due to the recent innovation of horizontal
drilling in fracking shale gas) and becomes more expen-
sive over time as less accessible fields have to be ex-
plored, hence E tð Þ ¼ E0 1−rEð Þ t S0=S tð Þð Þe1 with S(t)
denoting reserves at time t. We calibrate the initial cost
of fossil fuel extraction so that the energy sector is 5% of
GDP, hence E0 = 0.35 T$/GtC, and set S0 = 10,000 GtC,
e1 = 0.5, and rE = 0 (cf. Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016).
The cost of renewable energy R (including cost of infra-
structure and feed-in subsidies to foster learning by do-
ing) falls at the rate rR due to directed technical progress,
where following Nordhaus (2014), we suppose that pro-
ducing from carbon-free alternatives costs 5.6% of GDP
today and 2.7% of GDP at the end of the century, hence
R0 = 0.8 T$/GtCe and rR = 1% per annum until the price
of renewable energy reaches its lower floor of 0.4 T$/
GtCe near the end of the century (cf. Rezai and van der
Ploeg 2016). At time T, E(T) + P(T) =R0(1 − rR)T so from
then onwards, fossil fuel is too expensive and is priced
out of the market. This transition condition gives the
optimal cumulative emissions or the carbon budget for
short, B ≡ S0 − S(T):
B ¼ S0 1− E0 1−rEð Þ
T
R0 1−rRð ÞT−Ω SDR; gð Þd 1þ gð ÞTGDP0
 ! 1
e1
2
4
3
5: ð3Þ
The carbon budget is low if fossil fuel is expensive to
extract and if renewable energy is cheap to produce
(high E0 and low R0). The carbon budget is curbed by
the ethical, economic, and geophysical factors that drive
up the price of carbon (high SDR− g or highΩ from (1)
and (2), high d and high GDP0). If fossil fuel extraction
is expected to experience rapid directed technical prog-
ress, the optimal carbon budget will be higher. If renew-
able energy is expected to experience rapid technical
progress (as is the case now for solar energy), the
optimal carbon budget ends up lower as climate policy
5 This study follows Meinshausen et al. (2009) by focusing on cumu-
lative emissions up to 2050. This is misleading as peak global warming
depends on cumulative emissions forever into the future (e.g. Allen
et al. 2009; Allen 2016).
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has become cheaper. The fraction of stranded fossil fuel
assets, S(T)/S0 = (S0 − B)/S0, is then high.
End of carbon era and peak warming
Generally, more energy-efficient technologies are
described in a stylised fashion as using higher
capital and less energy inputs. Such technologies
arise when less fossil fuel energy inputs are used in
favour of more capital in response to, say, a tax on
the use of fossil fuel. However, empirical evidence
suggests that there is limited substitutability be-
tween energy and capital and labour (Hassler
et al. 2012) in which case fossil fuel use is propor-
tional to aggregate output. More specifically, fossil
fuel use is given by γ0(1 − rγ)tGDPt where the
initial energy intensity γ0 is calibrated at 0.15 GtC
per trillion dollars of world GDP (cf. Rezai and van
der Ploeg 2016). There might be a negative expo-
nential trend in the energy intensity or carbon in-
tensities of output at the rate rγ ≥ 0. If rγ > 0, then
the energy efficiency of the world economy in-
creases over time. A different way of looking at
this is that renewable energies and fossil fuel ener-
gies are bad substitutes as long as the problem of
storage is not solved in a cost-efficient manner.
More efficient-energy technologies can then be seen
as those which use more renewable and less fossil
fuel energies.
The carbon era ends when the total carbon emitted
equals the carbon budget, B. This implies that
B ¼ ∑Tt¼1 1þ gð Þtγ0 1−rγ
 t
GDP0≅ ð½ 1þ g−rγÞTþ1−1
γGDP0= g−rγ
 
; and thus gives the optimal transition
time to the carbon-free era:
T ¼ 1
g−rγ
ln 1þ g−rγ
  B
γ0GDP0
 
−1 if rγ≠g; T ¼ Bγ0GDP0
−1 rγ ¼ g: ð4Þ
The transition thus occurs more quickly if the
carbon budget B is small, expected economic
growth g is high, and the rate of increase in energy
efficiency rγ is small. To analyse the effect of
increases in energy efficiency, we first note from
(1) that this does not affect the optimal price of
carbon. We note from (4) that both a higher carbon
budget B and a higher energy efficiency leads to a
longer fossil fuel phase T. Equation (3) indicates
that cumulative emissions decrease with the length
of the fossil fuel phase T. The reason is that, if the
time of the switch to the carbon-free era takes place
later, technical progress in the renewable energies
industry has led to a lower cost of renewables and
economic growth has led to a higher cost of carbon.
Assuming that these outweigh the effect of techni-
cal progress on costs in the fossil fuel industry, we
see that higher T must be associated with lower
fossil fuel extraction cost and thus a lower cumula-
tive extraction B. Combining the comparative stat-
ics of Eqs. (3) and (4), we thus deduce that higher
energy efficiency or a rising trend in energy effi-
ciency leads to lower cumulative emissions and a
longer fossil fuel phase (lower B, higher T).
Finally, there is a robust relationship between
cumulative emissions and peak warming as the path-
way of carbon emissions matters less than the cu-
mulative emissions B (Allen et al. 2009):
PW ¼ Φ Bð Þ; Φ0 > 0; Φ00 ≤0: ð5Þ
Although a linear approximation to (5) works rea-
sonably well (Allen 2016), we use a quadratic which is
slightly more accurate.6 The carbon budget from pre-
industrial times onwards corresponding to a maximum
of 2 °C is 1 TtC, implying a carbon budget for cumula-
tive emissions of 350 GtC or 1283 GtCO2 from 2010
onwards.
Putting it together
Figure 1 solves (3) through (5) for the carbon budgetB, the
time T that the carbon-free era starts, and peak warming,
both for the social optimum if carbon is priced (see the
6 Allen (2016) suggests PW = 0.9 + 2 B/1000, which gives B equal to
550 GtC or 2017 GtCO2. See Appendix A.
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upward-sloping solid line) according to (1) and (2) and for
the business-as-usual scenario (BAU, see the upward-
sloping dashed line) if climate policy is absent (P = 0).7
In the bottom panel of Fig. 1, the carbon budget B falls
through (3) as the price of carbon is imposed. This implies
a quicker transition to renewable energy and lower peak
warming (left axis). The top panel illustrates the underlying
transitional dynamics in the energy market. As cumulative
emissions increase, the cost of extracting the remaining
stock fossil fuel increases. Simultaneously, the cost of
renewable energy decreases. The top panel shows that
the transition to the carbon-free era occurs when the cost
of fossil fuel has just exceeded that of renewable energy.
The difference between the climate policy (the upward-
sloping solid line in the top panel of Fig. 1) and BAU (the
upward-sloping dashed line) scenarios is the rising carbon
tax as determined by rule (2).
From (2), we know that a smaller SDR (due to more
patience, less intergenerational inequality aversion and,
if IIA > 1, lower trend GDP growth and more risk aver-
sion), a lower decay rate, and a shorter temperature lag
push up the carbon price and shift up the upward-
sloping solid climate policy line in the top panel of
Fig. 1. Renewable energy then becomes competitive
earlier when energy cost is relatively higher, leaving a
bigger fraction of fossil fuel reserves stranded, and
cutting cumulative emissions and peak warming.
If the coefficient of intergenerational inequality aver-
sion exceeds unity (IIA > 1), faster trend GDP growth
makes future generations richer and decreases the ethi-
cal onus on current generations to curb emissions, espe-
cially if IIA is high, so the SDR rises and climate policy
becomes less ambitious and temperature rises. A lower
and falling cost of renewable energy shifts down the cost
curve in the top panel (the downward-sloping solid line),
which curbs the carbon budget, brings forward the
carbon-free era and cuts peak warming. The energy cost
at the time of transition is now relatively lower.
Calibration and illustrative policy simulations
Figure 1 and also the results of our back-of-the-envelope
calculation shown in Table 2 that follow this are based on
the baseline calibration summarised in Table 1. We find
that in the baseline case with carbon pricing 1046 GtC is
burnt and global mean temperature relative to pre-
industrial temperatures peaks at 2.8 °C. With a growth-
corrected social discount rate of 2.36% per year, the initial
optimal carbon price is $27.5/tC and grows at 2% per
year from then on. The fossil fuel phase lasts 56 years.
Table 2 also reports some sensitivity exercises by
illustrating the impact of ethical and economic drivers
on the optimal carbon budget and peak warming. Ethical
considerations influence the transition to renewable ener-
gy through the optimal carbon price. As society’s aver-
sion to intergenerational inequality falls from 1.45 to 0.5,
peak warming falls from 2.8 to 1.8 °C and the carbon
budget from 1046 to 264 GtC. Similarly, not discounting
welfare of future generations at all, i.e. RTI = 0, cuts peak
warming to 2.1 °C and the carbon budget to 465 GtC.
If global economic growth slows from 2 to 1% per
annum, future material affluence will be lower and the
initial carbon price rises in order to shield future gener-
ations from climate-related damages to their weakened
economy. Peak warming declines to 2.6 °C correspond-
ing to a fall of the carbon budget to 836 GtC. Higher
vulnerability of the economy to climate change in the
form of higher damages has a similar effect on peak
warming and the carbon budget. A 20% reduction in
today’s cost of renewable (fossil) energy significantly
expedites (delays) the transition to the carbon-free era
and decreases (increases) peak warming to 2.3 °C
(3.2 °C) and the carbon budget to 642 GtC (1419
GtC). An acceleration of directed technical change in
the renewable sector from 1 to 2% per annum brings
forward the energy transition and cuts peak warming to
2.1 °C and the carbon budget to 473 GtC. The model
can be used to calculate the impacts of shifts in the
geophysical components in a similar fashion.
To illustrate the trade-offs between ethical and econom-
ic drivers, Fig. 2 shows contours of given peak warming
levels for different economic and ethical parameters. The
left panel of Fig. 2 shows how the discount rate and the
initial cost of renewable energy affect the optimal degree of
peak global warming. Lower peak warming requires
shifting closer to the origin, i.e. lower levels of discounting
and initial costs. It also illustrates how, given an ethical
parameter, peak warming can be brought down by subsi-
dies to renewable energy. The right panel of Fig. 2 shows
how optimal degrees of peak global warming can be
achieved by different levels of IIA and the rate of directed
technical change.
7 We need to solve the simultaneous equations (3) and (4) for B and T,
which is done in the Excel sheet accompanying this paper. Only with
no technical change whatsoever, g = rE = rR = 0, is the system
recursive.
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Peak warming can be lowered by moving to the
upper-left corner: lower preparedness to sacrifice utility
to cut future global warming (higher IIA) requires more
technical progress (higher rR) through policies stimulat-
ing innovation and R&D. Both panels illustrate how big
the challenge and how ambitious policies must be to
stay well below 2 °C peak warming as agreed in Paris.
Finally, let us now perform a sensitivity exercise
where the rate of increase in energy efficiency is 1.5 or
1% instead of zero per year (i.e. rγ = 0.015/year or 0.01/
year). The price of carbon is unaffected. From Eqs. (3)
and (4), we can calculate that the safe carbon budget
drops from 1046 GtC in the benchmark to 674 or 856
GtC and that the transition to the carbon-free era then
takes only a little longer, 58 or 57 years, respectively,
instead of 56 years.
Peak Warming, PW
Cost of CCS and  
fossil and renewable energy 
BAU 
Carbon Budget, B
2.8°C
3.8°C
Cost of fossil energy 
plus carbon tax Falling cost of 
renewable energy
1,025 GtC 2,290 GtC
PW0 + TCRE · B
Cost of fossil energy 
CCS
350$/tC
800$/tC
377$/tC
Climate Policy
Fig. 1 The rules (1)–(2) give the
carbon budget and end of carbon
era from (3)–(4) and peak
warming from (5) in the bottom
panel. The top panel illustrates the
dynamics as fossil fuel extraction
costs and the carbon price rise and
the cost of renewable energy falls
Table 1 Baseline calibration of the back-on-the-envelope IAM
Ethical
Rate of time impatience: RTI = 1.5%/year
Relative intergenerational inequality aversion and risk aversion:
IIA = RRA = 1.45
Economic
World economy: GDP0 = 66 T$, rate of growth: g = 2%/year,
volatility: σ = 0.036,
Fossil fuel use per unit of world GDP: γ0 = 0.15 GtC/T$, rate of
decline: rγ = 0%/year
Fossil fuel cost: E0 = 0.35 T$/GtC, rE = 0, e1 = 0.5,
Renewable energy cost: R0 = 0.8 T$/GtC, rate of decline:
rR = 1%/year
Flow damage as fraction of world GDP: d = 0.053 $/tC
Geophysical
Initial stock of fossil fuel reserves: S0 = 10,000 GtC
Coefficients permanent and transient box of carbon cycle:
a1 = 0.2, b1 = 0, a2 = 0.32, b2 = 0.0023
Average lag between temperature/damages and carbon stock:
l = 70 years
Transient climate response to cumulative emissions:
TCRE = 2 °C/TtC
Table 2 Sensitivity of peak warming and carbon budget to ethical
and economic drivers
Scenario PW
(°C)
Carbon
budget (GtC)
Baseline 2.8 1046
Ethical
Lower inequality aversion (IIA = 0.5) 1.8 264
Lower discount rate (RTI = 0%/year) 2.1 465
Economic
Lower economic growth rate
(g = 1%/year)
2.6 836
High Damage scenario (d = 0.08) 2.6 885
Lower initial cost of renewable energy
(R0 = 0.64 $T/GtC)
2.3 642
Lower initial cost of fossil energy
(E0 = 0.28 $T/GtC)
3.2 1419
Faster reductions in cost of renewable
energy (rr = 2%/year)
2.1 474
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Implementing the 2 °C target
At the 2015 Paris Summit, it has been agreed to limit
global warming well below 2 °C and to drive efforts to
limit the temperature increase to even further 1.5 °C. This
is lower than justified by the damages of global warming
estimated by economists and used by us. An extra safety
marginmay be justified to curb risks of tipping points and
run-away global warming. A 2 °C upper bound tells us
from (5) or the bottom panel of Fig. 1 that the associated
carbon budget should be on average 411 GtC instead of
1000 GtC. Under the assumption that the damages used
in our calibration are an under-estimate, we raise damages
just high enough to ensure that the carbon budget is
compatible with the 2 °C cap on global warming. These
higher damages require from (3) a higher carbon price: at
the transition to the carbon-free era, it should be 230 $/tC
for most scenarios. We back out from (4) that the transi-
tion to the carbon-free era is further brought forward from
56 to 30 years. These results are confirmed by simula-
tions for the optimal baseline and the 2 °C upper bound
scenarios in our full-scale IAM as shown in Fig. 3.
An alternative to adjusting damages from global
warming upwards to ensure that peak warming does
not exceed 2 °C is to abstract from damages entirely
and simply minimise the present discounted value of
costs subject to the constraint that peak warming must
not exceed 2 °C. This is what is done in the integrated
assessment literature and the resulting price of carbon
follows a Hotelling path and thus rises more rapidly at a
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rate equal to the rate of interest instead of the rate of
economic growth (e.g. Nordhaus 1982; Tol 2013; Bauer
et al. 2015). The more rapidly rising price of carbon then
reflects the increasing scarcity of carbon as the carbon
budget approaches exhaustion. However, if allowance is
made for the inertia between changes in global mean
temperature and the stock of atmospheric carbon, the
optimal price of carbonmay follow an inverse U-shaped
path and grows more slowly than the Hotelling path
(Lemoine and Rudik 2017). Combining the two ap-
proach by maximising welfare net of global warming
subject to the cap on peak warming or equivalently
subject to cumulative emissions being less than the safe
carbon budget gives a higher price of carbon than the
unconstrained welfare maximisation which grows at a
rate somewhere in between the interest rate and the rate
of economic growth (van der Ploeg 2017).
Performance of the simple rules
Most integrated assessment modellers make many ad-
ditional, and perhaps more realistic, assumptions about
economic damages of climate change or dynamics of
specific energy sources and crunch out the optimal price
of carbon (and sometimes also the stock of stranded
fossil fuel assets) by numerically maximising welfare
subject to the constraints of their large-scale IAM. The
question is how well our simple rules (1) through (5)
perform and compare with the optimal time path of
carbon prices, carbon budgets, and transition times de-
rived from more complex optimising IAMs. Table 3
therefore compares them with the globally optimal dis-
cretionary outcomes and the BAU outcomes for our
IAM with DICE damages and Oxford carbon and tem-
perature dynamics.8
Our toy IAM performs remarkably well, despite be-
ing based on a simple two-box carbon cycle, and adapts
accurately to changes in ethical judgement and techno-
logical progress (cf. Rezai and van der Ploeg 2016).
Cumulative fossil use differs by at most 8%, peak tem-
perature by 0.08 °C, and the initial optimal carbon price
by 14 $/tC.9 The transition times are also predicted well
by the simple rules (e.g. for the baseline 55 and 56 years
for the IAM and for the simple rule, respectively. The
social optimum avoids the peak temperatures of around
3.9 °C by locking up much more fossil fuel than the
average 2250 GtC burnt under BAU and by
transitioning to the carbon-free era in 56 years instead
of the end of the century.
Carbon capture and sequestration as backstop
Allen et al. 2009 have argued that there should be a
mandate that ensures all carbon emissions above the
budget compatible with 2 °C global warming should
be captured and sequestrated. Allen (2016) further
argued that considerations for the near-term mitiga-
tion efforts induced by pricing carbon should be
disregarded for long-term impacts of the carbon price
for sequestration efforts once the optimal carbon
budget will have been reached. Although this plea
resonates, a simple cap is not necessarily an efficient
strategy. It is more efficient to price carbon as this
offers a direct incentive to capture and sequester
carbon (as well as to make renewable energy more
attractive to use and develop and to phase out fossil
fuel more quickly). Furthermore, a price for carbon
allows trading to promote the least costly cuts in
carbon emissions. It avoids the government Bpicking
winners^ and instead promotes development of a
wide variety of renewable energy sources including
carbon capture and sequestration (CCS). This is im-
portant as CCS will, like many other potential new
sources of renewable energy, be at most a partial
solution to the climate challenge. But CCS faces
particular challenges: huge capital investments, envi-
ronmental hazards, and ugly NIMBY politics. Also,
as CCS requires lots of space, it is difficult to scale up
as costs rise as space is used up. Abatement with CCS
(e.g. new coal, coal retrofit, industrial) is still one of
the more expensive forms of abatement. Analytically,
the cost of fossil fuel with CCS equals E tð Þ ¼ E0
1−rEð Þ t S0=S tð Þð Þe1 per ton of carbon plus the mar-
ginal cost of abating one ton of carbon, say A. This is
indicated by the upward-sloping dotted black line in
Fig. 1. It follows that, like fossil fuel on its own, the
cost of CCS rises as reserves are depleted. It thus
only becomes attractive for the market when the
marginal cost of abatement falls below the carbon
8 With uncertainty about future consumption growth, the SDR in the
baseline is cut by 0.14% per annum. This curbs the carbon budget and
peak global warming by only 36 GtC and 0.04 °C, respectively.
9 Allen (2016) proposes an initial carbon tax of 91 $/tC (25 $/tCO2) in
a framework with SDR − g = 1.5%/year and where marginal damages
and the carbon tax (2) are linear in GDP.
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price. This happens once GDP and the carbon price
have risen far enough or when new technology has
diminished the cost of CCS sufficiently, but working
against this is that once CCS is scaled up, space
becomes ever more costly. Given these cost develop-
ments, CCS is likely to be dominated by various
forms of renewable energy in the market. Forcing it
on the market by mandating it is thus an inefficient
way to achieve climate objectives and one would
hope one does not have to resort to this once it is
too late to rely on conventional, more cost-effective
climate policies to curb emissions.
Conclusion
Our assessment of how the optimal carbon price and
stranded assets interact with economic growth, re-
newable energy technology, fossil fuel scarcity, eth-
ical considerations, and fundamental geophysical
parameters is transparent and gives easy-to-
understand simple rules that perform well in large-
scale IAMs. These rules are transparent and robust
and in this sense more useful than a discretionary
time path of optimal climate policies usually obtain-
ed from IAMs. We hope that our back-on-the-
envelope framework allows climate scientists not
actively engaged in economic modelling to under-
stand the critical assumptions driving the social cost
and price of carbon, untapped fossil fuel and the
time to reach the carbon-free era in terms of ethical
considerations and expected economic growth and
cost reductions in renewable energy. In our frame-
work, exogenous improvements in energy efficiency
do not affect the optimal price of carbon, but do
delay the transition time to the carbon-free era
somewhat and provided technical progress in renew-
able energies or the rate of economic growth are
strong enough also depress cumulative emissions
and peak global warming significantly.
Our results suggest that the global warming dam-
ages estimated and ethical assumptions chosen by
economists are likely to lead to global warming that
exceeds the 2 °C target. To ensure that global
warming always stays below 2 °C, the carbon price
must be raised above what conventional economic
damages tell us to do and more fossil fuel must be
locked up. In recent estimates of the non-climate-
related health benefits of abandoning fossil fuels
(e.g. Parry et al. 2014; Thompson et al. 2014; West
et al. 2013; Ščasný et al. 2015), the effects of un-
certainty about the steepness of climate damages
(Crost and Traeger 2014) and the potential of mul-
tiple abrupt disruptions in the climate system (Cai
et al. 2016; Lemoine and Traeger 2016) provide
ample reasons for raising the carbon price.
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Table 3 The simple rules predict the fully fledged IAM outcomes in terms of cumulative emissions and peak temperature well. They also
predict the deleterious effects of policy inaction
Scenario Parameters Optimal carbon budget Peak temperature Initial price
RTI
(%)
IIA g
(%)
SDR
(%)
Full IAM
(GtC)
Toy IAM
(GtC)
Full IAM
(°C)
Toy IAM
(°C)
Full IAM
($/tC)
TOY IAM
($/tC)
Conventional
(2 × 2 × 2)
2 2 2 6 1,307 1293 3.06 3.07 20 12
Baseline
(Nordhaus)
1.5 1.45 2 4.4 979 1025 2.73 2.78 29 27
Lower discounting 0.1 1.45 2 3 569 525 2.24 2.16 81 95
Lower IIA 1.5 1 2 3.5 759 748 2.47 2.45 51 55
Lower trend growth 1.5 1.45 1 3 805 820 2.53 2.54 37 38
Business-as-usual Full IAM: cumulative emissions 2250–2300 GtC. Peak temperature 3.89 °C
Toy IAM: cumulative emissions 2230–2275 GtC. Peak temperature 3.84 °C
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Appendix
Cumulative emissions and peak warming
Allen et al. (2009) present a reduced-form model of the
climate and argue that cumulative emissions in all future
years—rather than the actual emissions profile—matters
for peak warming. Figure 4 presents the relationship
between peak temperature and this carbon budget in
TtC for over 500 simulations in the optimising variant
of our IAM. The quadratic approximation used in our
toy IAM is robust and very well determined. The DICE
model displays a similar relationship between peak
warming and cumulative emissions.
Allen (2016) states that a global temperature increase
in line with cumulative CO2 emissions suggests the
following simple expression for the temperature re-
sponse to a pulse emission of an additional ton of CO2
at time t:
δTemptþt0 ¼ TCRE  1−e−KSt
0
 
; ðA1Þ
where 1/KS is the initial pulse-adjustment time scale of
the climate system (of order decade or less) and TCRE is
the approximately constant transient climate response to
cumulative emissions. This is valid for cumulative emis-
sions up to 5000 GtC and gives the linear approximation
PW≅0:9°Cþ TCRE  B; ðA2Þ
where Allen (2016) uses an initial temperature of and a
mid-range value of TCRE = 2°C/TtC. Although this lin-
ear approximation performs reasonable well for low
levels of peak warming (see plot in Fig. 4), we use a
quadratic approximation which is calibrated to the car-
bon cycle of the full IAM both in terms of the initial
temperature intercept and the slope.
Parameter combinations for 2 °C
Working backward form a peak warming target of 2 °C,
we can use (5) to obtain a carbon budget of 411 GtC.We
can then use our rules for the carbon tax (1) and (2) and
the carbon budget (3) to find out which parameter com-
binations would make the 2 °C target feasible. Table 4
collects the pairs of (g, SDR) consistent with 2 °C of
warming. These can be achieved through combinations
of the rate of time impatience (RTI) and the coefficient
of relative intergenerational inequality aversion (IIA).
Higher levels of growth permit a higher SDR. Since
(ignoring the prudence term) SDR =RTI + IIA × g, the
permissible values for RTI are higher and the values for
IIA lower.
For example, with an economic growth rate of 2%
per annum, the RTI would have to be between 0 and
0.8%with a corresponding aversion parameter of 1.4–1.
If the trend growth rate rises to 3% per annum, the RTI
has to be between 0 and 0.9% with a corresponding
aversion parameter of 1.3–1. The reason for limiting IIA
is that as economic growth rises, future generations are
deemed rich enough to handle slightly higher tempera-
ture increases (in the absence of abrupt climate change).
To offset this effect and maintain the 2 °C target, the
permissible parameter range for IIA is lowered as the
trend economic growth rate increases.
At the time of the switch to the carbon-free era, 2038,
the carbon price has to be 250 $/tC in the 2 °C scenario.
The baseline carbon price is then 147.5 $/tC. Lowering
the utility discount rate, keeping IIA at 1.45, to zero only
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
0.0 0.5 1.0 1.5 2.0 2.5 3.0
Pe
ak
 W
ar
m
in
g 
(°
C
)
Carbon Budget (TtC)
Carbon Budget and Peak Warming
linear approximaon
PW = 0.9 + 2 B
quadrac approximaon
PW = 1,39 + 1,58 B - 2,17 B²
Fig. 4 A robust relationship between the carbon budget and peak
warming for the Oxford system based on 500+ simulations in our
optimising IAM
Table 4 Parameter combinations that achieve the target of 2 °C
ignoring prudence. Higher trend growth requires less patience and
a lower rate of intergenerational inequality aversion
RTI (%) IIA g (%) SDR (%)
0 1.7 1 1.7
0.25 1.45 1 1.7
0.7 1 1 1.7
0 1.4 2 2.8
0.8 1 2 2.8
0 1.3 3 3.9
0.9 1 3 3.9
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raises the carbon price to 108 $/tC so that global
warming still exceeds 2 °C. If the RTI is cut to zero
and the IIA to 1.4 or the RTI is cut to 0.8% and IIA to 1,
the target of 2 °C is compatible with DICE damages.
Description of the optimising IAM
The economic core of our optimising IAM is presented
in Rezai and van der Ploeg (2016). However, here we
use the Oxford carbon cycle (e.g. Allen et al. 2009)
instead of the carbon cycle of DICE or of Golosov
et al. (2014). We use our IAM instead of DICE, since
we have scarcity rents on fossil fuel and allow extraction
costs of fossil fuel to rise as reserves get depleted in
order to solve for the optimal amount of stranded assets.
The economic part of our IAM is calibrated to data for
2010: world GDP is 66 trillion US $, the initial capital
stock is 150 trillion US $, and initial energy use is 9.94
GtCe. The world population is 7 billion initially and is
assumed to stabilise at 11 billion at the end of the
century. We assume a depreciation rate for capital of
10% per annum and a Cobb-Douglas technology with
30 and 70% as the shares of capital and labour, respec-
tively. We assume that for each trillion of output that is
produced γ = 0.150 GtC of fossil fuel is needed, which
is in line with a Leontief technology. The initial cost of
renewable energy b(0) is initially $800/tCe. The rate of
technical progress in renewable energy is 1% per annum
until the price of renewable energy reaches its lower
floor of $400/tCe near the end of the century. The cost
function for oil extraction has $350/tC (e0 = 0.35) which
gives the share of energy in output of about 5%. Extrac-
tion costs evolve with e1 = 0.5 and the initial stock of
fossil fuel reserves is 10,000 GtC. This means that
initially renewable energy is more than twice as expen-
sive as fossil energy initially but renewable energy has
the potential to reach current energy prices after all
learning has happened.
Our optimising IAM has an initial phase where only
fossil fuel is used in the production process, an interme-
diate phase where fossil fuel and renewable energy are
used alongside each other, and a final phase where only
renewable energy is used. The economic block of our
IAM consists of a capital accumulation equation with an
associated Euler equation for the optimal expected
growth in consumption per capita and a depletion equa-
tion for fossil fuel reserves with an associated modified
Hotelling rule describing the scarcity rent as the present
value of all future reductions in marginal extraction
costs of fossil fuel resulting from burning one ton of
carbon today. The Oxford carbon cycle consists relative
to the DICE and the two-box carbon cycle of Golosov
et al. (2014) of a relatively large number of dynamic
equations (i.e. 7) describing the stocks of carbon in the
atmosphere and the oceans as well as global tempera-
ture. These carbon cycle difference equations have an
associated number of difference equations for the co-
states, which generate the social cost of carbon. Our full
optimising IAM thus consists of nine difference equa-
tions for the states and another nine for the co-states.
Our solution algorithm for this 18-dimensional two-
point boundary value problem solves our IAM in a
forward-looking manner such that the transversality
conditions are satisfied.
Finally, it should be acknowledged that recently
IAMs have been criticised for their lack of proper un-
derpinnings (e.g. Pindyck 2013). In particular, it is dif-
ficult to assess the costs and benefits of cutting global
warming many decades and centuries ahead, especially
when it comes to costs of global warming, the climate
sensitivity, and key ethical parameters. In defence, it has
been argued that using an IAM is better than no IAM
and that there is no reliable alternative to calculate the
social cost of carbon (e.g. Metcalf and Stock 2015).
Although IAMs are useful in policy debates, we believe
their results are difficult to communicate and compre-
hend. This is the main reason why we advocate the use
of transparent and simple framework and an easy-to-
understand rule. This ensures that the communication to
policy makers is easier while not suggesting more sci-
entific precision than is warranted (cf. Pindyck 2017).
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